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Cooperation is central to the success of human societies as it is crucial for overcoming some
of the most pressing social challenges of our time. Yet how human cooperation is achieved and
may persist is still a main puzzle in the social and biological sciences. Recently, scholars have
recognized the importance of social norms as solutions to major local and large-scale collective
action problems, from the management of water resources to the reduction of smoking in public
places to the change in fertility practices. Yet a well-founded model of the effect of social norms on
human cooperation is still lacking. Using statistical physics techniques and integrating findings from
cognitive and behavioral sciences, we present an analytically-tractable model in which individuals
base their decisions to cooperate both on the economic rewards they obtain and on the degree to
which their action comply with social norms. Results from this parsimonious model are in agreement
with what has been observed in recent large-scale experiments with humans. We also find the phase
diagram of the model and show that the experimental human group is poised near a critical point,
a regime where recent work suggests living systems respond to changing external conditions in an
efficient and coordinated manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is crucial to human social life, from friend-
ship and professional relationships, to political participa-
tion and global level issues, like ecological conservation
and international relations. Yet cooperation is often indi-
vidually costly, making it inherently fragile. Many schol-
ars have then been concentrated on understanding how
to sustain it.
Mechanisms such as reputation [1], communication
and sanction [2], as well as social identity-related fac-
tors [3] have been found to play a key role in promoting
human cooperative behavior.
Recent solid empirical and field work evidence is
mounting to suggest that social norms are successful in
the provision and maintenance of cooperation in every-
day life [4–8]. Social norms are informal rules that pre-
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scribe what individuals ought or ought not to do and
are typically enforced through informal sanctions, like
ostracism, negative gossip, shame or disapproval [9–11].
They sustain behavior through shared beliefs and recip-
rocal expectations regarding the appropriate actions to
perform in specific circumstances. Indispensable to so-
cial life, they are referred to as the ‘cement’ [11] or the
‘grammar’ of society [9].
Despite their importance, a rigorous and well-grounded
model of how social norms affect human cooperative
behavior is still lacking (see Sec. II). Using statistical
physics techniques and consistent with findings from the
cognitive and behavioral sciences [5, 9, 12, 13], we de-
velop here an analytically-tractable model in which the
decision makers’ utility is based on a balancing between
the material rewards they obtain and on the degree to
which their action is in agreement with social norms. We
explicitly incorporate the human ability to be sensitive to
social norms—their so called norm psychology [12]—into
the Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) [14] frame-
work. EWA is a modeling approach that combines both
2reinforcement learning [15] and belief learning [16] that
has been extensively explored in the field of behavioral
economics and rather successful in explaining the inter-
active learning of humans in games [17, 18].
Results from our cognitively inspired model are in
agreement with observations from recent large-scale ex-
periments with humans (625 subjects) playing simulta-
neously large-scale Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games [19].
The model quantitatively reproduces both the global
cooperation level (i.e., a decay from an initial value of
60% to around 35%) and the final distribution of agents
according to their probability of cooperation. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that quanti-
tatively reproduces both characteristics. The best at-
tempts we know of are reported in Refs. [20–24] but,
except for Ref. [24], the focus of those works are on a
qualitative rather than quantitative understanding. The
experiments studied in Ref. [24] have some differences
with the type of experiments we analyze here, rendering
a careful comparison more difficult (see Sec. II for a dis-
cussion of the main differences). Furthermore, the mod-
els presented in those works are not necessarily based
on empirically-grounded cognitively-motivated assump-
tions, as the one we introduce here.
Our model is also parsimonious enough to allow for a
detailed characterization of its long-term dynamics. We
identify three parameter regimes where the system can
be mono-stable, bi-stable, or remain out of equilibrium.
Such regimes are separated by surfaces that terminate
on a line of critical points, where it is well-known that
systems can develop long range correlations and become
highly responsive to external stimuli [25–36].
Our findings suggest that groups of individuals who
base their choice to cooperate on a balancing between
selfishness and compliance with social norms poise near a
critical point, where their capacity to respond efficiently
to changing and widely diverse external conditions can
be enhanced [26]. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first experimental evidence that human cooperative
groups may operate near criticality (see e.g., Sec. IV of
the very recent review in Ref. [25] for a detailed descrip-
tion of relevant works). This result hence points to an
unexplored feature of human cooperation that may sug-
gest a way in which social norms, besides promoting co-
operation, can also enhance the ability of human groups
to adapt to external variability. Similar results have been
found in experiments with ants [28].
This work is outlined as follows. In Sec. II we dis-
cuss previous research and provide an overview of the
different components and assumptions of our agent-based
model. In Sec. III we describe the learning component
of the model. In Sec. IV we describe how agents make
decisions by balancing individual and normative consid-
erations. In Sec. V we make use of two further assump-
tions consistent with experiments, i.e., slow adaptation
and absence of network reciprocity, to turn the stochas-
tic agent-based model on networks presented in Sec. IV
into a four-parameter deterministic model of a single rep-
resentative agent. In Sec. VI we determine the phase
diagram of the effective single-agent model obtained in
Sec. V and show that the model can display critical phe-
nomena. In Sec. VII we extract the parameters of the
effective single-agent model from experimental data and
show that human groups playing in the experiments are
posed near criticality. In Sec. VIII we present the conclu-
sions of the work. In the Appendices we present further
technical details.
II. PREVIOUS WORK AND MODEL
OVERVIEW
While there is a large number of literature on physics-
based models of human cooperation (see e.g., Ref. [37]
for a recent review), most of these models are theoretical
works that do not take into account experimental evi-
dence. Already about a decade ago a relevant review ar-
ticle [38] noticed that the ‘contribution of physicists in es-
tablishing social dynamics as a sound discipline grounded
on empirical evidence has been so far insufficient’. In a
recent ‘mini-review’ [39], one of the leading researchers in
the field remarked that even though ‘there are many rel-
evant experimental results on cooperation on structured
populations published in widely read journals while, un-
fortunately, many models are introduced in the literature
without taking into account [such experimental] facts’.
Some of the most relevant experimental findings, as sum-
marized by Sanchez [39], are: (i) lattices or networks do
not support cooperation; (ii) people display Moody Con-
ditional Cooperation (MCC), i.e., when deciding to coop-
erate individuals are responsive to the behavior of others,
but only if they have cooperated themselves; (iii) people
do not take into account the earnings of their neighbors;
and (iv) cooperation can be sustained in dynamic net-
works.
Indeed, as pointed out in the Introduction, we have
identified only few references [20–24] that have attempted
to build empirically grounded models to explain the type
of experiments we analyze here. However, except for
Ref. [24], the focus of those works was on obtaining a
qualitative understanding of the phenomena observed in
this type of experiments.
In contrast, our work, as well as that by Horita et
al. [24], are quantitative studies. Horita et al. [24] com-
pare the explanatory power of models of conditional co-
operation [40, 41] and their moody variant (MCC) [19] to
reinforcement learning models in explaining cooperation
under multiplayer social dilemma games. They fit these
models to empirical data obtained from behavioral ex-
periments, namely Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods
Games. However, because their experiments have some
differences with the type of experiments we analyze here,
rendering a careful comparison is more difficult. For in-
stance, while we analyze experiments with 625 subjects
interacting on a network during 52 rounds, Horita et al.
study experiments where 100 individuals interact dur-
ing 20 rounds either within fixed groups of four people
3each or with groups of four individuals chosen at ran-
dom. The authors then aggregate the decisions made
by individuals of all groups during all the rounds into
a single dataset (see e.g. Eq. (13) in Ref. [24]). It is
not clear to us whether relevant dynamical information
is not lost in this aggregation process. In contrast, we
extract our model parameters from relevant statistical
features of individual large-scale experiments using tech-
niques that explicitly acknowledge the dynamical nature
of our model (see e.g. Eq. (E1) in Appendix E).
Horita et al. [24] provide evidence that (model-free)
reinforcement learning algorithms where agents have no
access to information about decisions made by their
neighbors can account for the observed human behav-
ior roughly as accurately as algorithms where agents can
directly encode the MCC rule. This result is particularly
evident in those treatments in which subjects interact
with different people at every stage, i.e., where norms
and expectations about the actions of others are more
difficult to emerge. This finding is consistent with evi-
dence from the cognitive and behavioral sciences that in-
spired our model [5, 42] showing that although reinforce-
ment learning plays an important role in governing hu-
man behavior, when involved in repeated and long-term
interactions with the same people, individuals’ choices
are not independent from other people’s behavior, but
highly conditional on what they believe others will do.
In the experiments analyzed by Horita et al. and those
we analyze here the information about neighbor’s deci-
sions necessary to compute the normative reasoning (see
Sec. IVC) can in principle be extracted from the mate-
rial payoffs. So, it is not unreasonable to expect that in
these experiments subjects can indirectly infer normative
information from material payoffs only, as suggested by
Horita et al. A possible way to resolve this ambiguity
in the future could be to design experiments where this
peculiar situation does not hold.
On the other hand, theoretical and empirical evi-
dence suggests that human strategic behavior is based
not only on model-free reinforcement learning but also
on model-based reinforcement learning (i.e., belief learn-
ing) [14, 43, 44]. These two types of algorithms are re-
lated to habits that subjects acquired from past experi-
ences and goals that they expect to achieve in the fu-
ture, respectively. In contrast to Horita et al., our EWA-
inspired model is a hybrid between these two learning
algorithms. Although we assume an equal weight for
both model-free and model-based reinforcement to sim-
plify the analysis, the EWA component of our model can
be easily generalized to incorporate the desired weight to
each of these two algorithms. In future studies, this could
be used to investigate which of the two approximations
is more accurate, i.e., assuming all weight on model-free
reinforcement learning as in Ref. [24] or assuming equal
weight for both model-free and model-based reinforce-
ment learning as we do here.
Additionally, the model we present here encodes
empirically-grounded cognitive assumptions, as summa-
rized in Table I.
The first block of assumptions in Table I are spe-
cific to the EWA learning algorithm (see Sec. III). While
Refs. [20–22] implement a heuristic evolutionary dynam-
ics, none actually implements the EWA learning dynam-
ics [14], which is based on empirically sounder cognitive
assumptions. Indeed, in Ref. [20] authors recognize that
‘the original formulation of EWA cannot be trivially gen-
eralized to our MCC scenario’ and attempt to reproduce
key features of the EWA updating by a linear combi-
nation of belief and reinforcement learning (see Supple-
mentary Information of Ref. [20] under the section ti-
tled ‘SI EWA’). EWA, however, is known to be a better
model than such a mixture (see e.g., item 3 in page 323
of Ref. [57]). Furthermore, in EWA agents learn solely
from what they earned or could have earned, in agree-
ment with experimental finding (iii) above.
The second block of assumptions in Table I are spe-
cific to the normative component. These assumptions
rely on theoretical and empirical studies showing that
human decisions are not only driven by selfish consider-
ations but also influenced by social norms (i.e., informal
social rules prescribing what individuals ought or ought
not to do [12, 13, 47]). Moreover, those postulations are
also aimed to account for the fact that the more salient—
i.e., relevant—the norm is perceived to be, the stronger
its impact on the individual’s motivation to comply with
it. Vilone et al. [22] point out that the interplay of so-
cial and strategic motivations in human interactions is a
largely unexplored topic in collective social phenomena.
They implement a heuristic algorithm where, at each it-
eration, agents choose with a certain probability either
to update their strategy by imitating a neighbor picked
at random or to update their strategy based on strate-
gic considerations. In addition to being heuristic, not
necessarily based on empirical evidence, in the strategic
component of their update rule agents take into account
the earning of their neighbors in contrast with the exper-
imental finding (iii) above.
Our model, in addition to respecting experimental
finding (iii), incorporates empirically grounded norma-
tive assumptions into the EWA framework while still con-
serving its general structure (see Sec. IV). Apart from
being affected by the expectations and actions of their
peers, individuals’ decision to cooperate depends also on
their ‘mood’. Consistently with experimental finding (ii)
above, when deciding to cooperate agents are responsive
to the behavior of others, but only if they have cooper-
ated themselves.
The first two blocks of assumptions lead to a stochastic
agent-based model in which agents interact on a given
(static) network and balance individual and normative
considerations in their decision-making. It should not be
difficult to extend this model to incorporate dynamical
networks that can also take into account experimental
finding (iv) above. However, we here restrict our analy-
sis to static networks, which allows for further simplifi-
cations.
4Assumption Description Representation Reference
1
s
t
b
lo
c
k
Bounded rationality Agents do not always play the optimal strategy β in Eq. (1) [14, 45, 46]
Belief learning
Agents learn from what could have potentially
Eq. (2) [14, 45, 46]
happened
Reinforcement learning Agents learn from what actually happened Eq. (2) [14, 45, 46]
Memory decay Agents give more relevance to recent events α in Eq. (2) [14, 45, 46]
Selfishness
Agents base their decisions on self-regarding
∆IC , ∆ID, Eqs. (3) and (4) [14, 45, 46]
considerations
2
n
d
b
lo
c
k
Norm conformity: Agents base their decisions also on social norms h in Eqs. (3) and (5) [47, 48]
- Self-consistency
Agents are consistent with own beliefs and
wC in Eq. (5) [49–51]
self-ascribed norms
- Social influence
Norm compliance increases with the number of
wO in Eq. (5) [40, 52]
compliant peers
- Moody conditional coop.
Social influence is stronger if aligned with
wI in Eq. (5) [53]
self-consistency
3
r
d
b
lo
c
k
Slow adaptation
Adaptation happens over several individual
Eqs. (9) and (10) [19, 54]
strategic choices
No network reciprocity
Interaction structure does not significantly
Eqs. (11) and (12) [19, 52, 54–56]
influence behavior
TABLE I. Summary of assumptions underlying model presented here. The first block of assumptions corresponds to the Expe-
rience Weighted Attraction (EWA) model introduced in Ref. [14], restricted to the special case discussed in the Supplementary
Information of Ref. [45] [see Sec. I there; cf. Ref. [46]]. More specifically: (i) while EWA allows for belief and reinforcement
learning to have different weights, here they have the same weight [see Eq. (2)]; (ii) while EWA allows for the interpolation
between average and cumulative reinforcement learning, here the focus is exclusively on cumulative reinforcement learning [see
Eq. (2)]. These leads to a model characterized by the drive [see Eq. (2)] and two parameters: (i) parameter α that captures
the exponential decrease of the relevance of past events; if α = 1 agents only remember what happened in the previous round,
while if α = 0 agents have cumulative information of the full history of play; (ii) parameter β that captures the success of
agents in choosing the optimal strategy; if β ≫ 1 agents usually choose the optimal strategy, while if β = 0 agents choose
strategies at random. To the best of our knowledge, the EWA model is based exclusively on self-regarding considerations.
The second block of assumptions extend the EWA model to include norm-based considerations. The importance agents give to
normative considerations is characterized by parameter h; if h = 0 (if h≫ 1) only individual (normative) considerations matter.
The normative component implements three processes characterized by parameters wC , wO and wI . The more the norm is
perceived as salient, i.e. relevant, by the agent the higher its impact on the agent’s decision. These parameters determine how
the norm salience is updated. Parameter wC , however, can be absorbed in parameter h, so we take wC = 1. These two blocks
of assumptions lead to a stochastic agent-based model where interactions take place on a given network. The third block of
assumptions transform the model into a deterministic analytically-tractable model of a single representative agent characterized
by parameter α and three effective parameters [see Eqs. (11)-(16)]; these three effective parameters fully specify the long-term
dynamics of the model (see Sec. IV).
Finally, the third block of assumptions is also consis-
tent with experimental evidence. Indeed, the nearly lin-
ear trend that usually characterizes the MCC rule in the
type of experiments we analyze (see e.g., Figs. 3A and 3B
in Ref. [19]) is consistent with a relatively large random-
ness in agents’ strategic choices (i.e., parameter β ≪ 1;
see Table I). This implies that the time scale associated to
individual strategic choices is smaller than the time scale
on which adaptation happens, i.e., adaptation can be as-
sumed slow; this assumption allows to turn the stochastic
agent-based model into a deterministic one (see Sec. V).
The second assumption in this block exploits experimen-
tal finding (i) to turn the resulting deterministic model
of agents interacting on a (static) network into an effec-
tive four-parameter model of a single representative agent
(see Sec. V). This four-parameter model is parsimonious
enough to allow for the analytical determination of its
long-term dynamics (see Sec. VI). We emphasize once
again that this effective model is restricted to the study
of interactions on static networks.
A remark is in order: While the reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms studied by Horita et al. [24] conserve the
identity of the individuals, our mean field model just de-
scribed is based solely on a single representative agent.
While our single-agent model depends on four parame-
ters, the two models studied by Horita et al. depend
only on two or three parameters. However, our mean
field four-parameter model is parsimonious enough to
allow for the analytical characterization of its different
dynamical regimes. Avoiding the adiabatic and mean
field approximations described above, as well as the equal
weights between model-free and model-based reinforce-
ment learning, we could turn our model into a stochastic
agent-based model that includes as special case the two-
5parameter model studied by Horita et al. In the future,
such more general model could be used along with model
selection techniques to better compare ours with the work
of Horita et al.
III. LEARNING ALGORITHM
Here we describe the learning component of the EWA
model, which incorporates the first block of assumptions
in Table I. In the next section, we discuss how to extend
this model to include normative considerations in agents’
decision-making.
Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that human
social strategic behavior is based on a combination of
model-free and model-based reinforcement learning algo-
rithms [14, 43, 44]. These models are related to habits
that subjects acquired from past experiences and goals
that they expect to achieve in the future, respectively.
Under some circumstances [45, 46], carefully described
in the first section of the supplementary information of
Ref. [45], this can be captured by a simplified form of
the EWA model [14]. EWA is a modeling approach
that combines both reinforcement learning [15] and be-
lief learning [16]. The former refers to reinforcing actions
based on agents’ past performance, and the latter refers
to reasoning about how actions that have not been chosen
would have performed. One of the key insights provided
by EWA is that belief learning can also be understood
as a process in which actions are reinforced by forgone
payoffs. In this sense, EWA is a combination of model-
free and model-based reinforcement learning [58]. The
simplified EWA model [45, 46] which we are interested in
here can be described by the equations
xi(t+ 1) =
1
1 + e−βDi(t+1)
, (1)
Di(t+ 1) = (1− α)Di(t) + ∆Ui(t). (2)
Here xi(t+1) and Di(t+1) are, respectively, the proba-
bility and motivation or drive of agent i to cooperate at
round t+ 1. When the parameter β ≥ 0 is large, agent i
tends to cooperate or defect, if the motivation is positive
or negative, respectively; if instead the motivation or β
are zero, the agent acts randomly. Intermediate values of
β interpolate between these two extremes—rational op-
timization and random behavior. The term ∆Ui(t) in
Eq. (2) is the difference in utilities resulting from the
choice of either cooperate or defect. If ∆Ui(t) > 0, agent
i’s motivation to cooperate increases; if ∆Ui(t) < 0, the
motivation decreases, while if ∆Ui(t) = 0 it stays the
same. Finally, the parameter α describes memory loss:
if α = 1, the agent remembers only the previous round t,
while if α = 0, the agent has cumulative information of
the full history of play. The case of 0 < α < 1 amounts
to an exponential discount of utility over time.
While the EWA model assumes that agents’ motiva-
tion to cooperate ∆Ui(t) is specified exclusively by indi-
vidual considerations, e.g., material payoffs, in this work
we extend the EWA formalism to incorporate normative
considerations, as described in the next section.
IV. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Here we discuss how we extend the EWA model (see
Sec. III) to make agents balance between individual and
normative considerations in their decision-making. The
individual component is common to previous EWA mod-
els and implements the assumption of selfishness in Ta-
ble I, while the normative component is introduced in this
work and implements the second block of assumptions
in Table I. We combine both considerations by defin-
ing agents’ motivation to cooperate ∆Ui(t) as a weighted
sum of the individual and normative components. This
combination is also consistent with experimental obser-
vations suggesting that a common area in the brain cor-
relates with the computation of both monetary and social
rewards [59] (see also Ref. [60]). The idea that norms can
be conceived as part of the utility function that individu-
als maximize is receiving growing attention and empirical
support [13, 22, 60–63]. In these works, however, social
norms typically have an exogenously specified impact on
individuals’ behavior; while we assume that this impact is
endogenously updated on the basis of how salient, namely
relevant, the specific norm is perceived to be.
A. Decision rule to cooperate
Decades of theoretical and experimental work are
nowadays putting on solid grounds that when decid-
ing whether to cooperate, humans do not always make
choices that maximize their personal payoffs, but they
also care about behaving in line with others in their
group. Social norms accurately provide information
about how members within a certain group will behave
and more importantly about how they are prescribed to
behave [7, 9, 64].
Consistent with this evidence and in analogy with
Ref. [47], we develop a model in which the decision mak-
ers’ utility ∆Ui(t) is based on the material rewards they
obtain and on the degree to which their actions comply
with social norms. Thus,
∆Ui(t) = ∆Ii(t) + h∆Ni(t), (3)
where the individual drive ∆Ii(t) models the motivation
to maximize personal material payoffs and the normative
drive ∆Ni(t) models the motivation to comply with so-
cial norms (see Sec. IVC below for more details). The
parameter h weights the relative influence of selfish and
norm-based motivations on cooperative decision-making:
if h = 0, agents do not care about normative information,
while if h is very large, agents’ behavior is dominated by
what the norm dictates. It also defines a relative time-
scale between selfish and pro-social reasoning, related to
reflection and intuition [65].
6In this way we have incorporated the ability to bal-
ance between normative and selfish considerations into
the EWA model, keeping the standard EWA formalism
almost intact. The impact of both types of considera-
tions on individual decisions has been scarcely explored
(but see Refs. [13, 22, 60, 63, 65]).
B. Individual component
Here we describe the individual component of the
model, which implements the assumption of selfishness
in Table I. We also describe the specific case of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) game because this is the game
implemented in the experiment we analyze in Sec. VII.
Clearly, other types of games can also be implemented
by defining the payoffs accordingly.
We are interested in the situation where agents interact
pairwise by playing a given two-player game with each
neighbor in a social network [19, 54]. In this case, we
can write the individual motivation for agent i to coop-
erate in her interaction with her neighbor j at round t as
∆Iij(t) = sj(t)∆IC + [1− sj(t)]∆ID. Here sj(t) refers
to the strategy played by agent j at round t, i.e., whether
she cooperated sj(t) = 1 or defected sj(t) = 0, while
∆IC = R− T and ∆ID = S −P , where R is i’s reward’s
payoff when both agents cooperate, P is i’s punishment’s
payoff when both agents defect, S is i’s sucker’s payoff
when i cooperates and j defects, and T is i’s temptation’s
payoff when i defects and j cooperates.
The total payoff received by an agent i interacting with
K neighbors is given by the average over the payoffs ob-
tained on each of the K pairwise games the agent is in-
volved in. So, the individual drive of agent i to cooperate
at round t is
∆Ii(t) = (∆IC −∆ID) 1
K
ni(t) + ∆ID, (4)
where ni =
∑
j∈∂i sj refers to the number of i’s peers
who cooperate, and ∂i stands for the set of neighbors of
i in the social network.
If the payoffs satisfy T > R > P > S, we have the
PD game; furthermore 2R > T + S for iterated PD
games. The structure of social dilemma is the following:
although the best individual choice for both is to defect,
mutual cooperation yields a better payoff than mutual
defection (R > P ). The experiments that we analyze
here correspond to a weak PD game where, in Experi-
mental Currency Units (ECUs), R = 7 ECUs, T = 10
ECUs, and P = S = 0 ECUs; so, ∆IC = −3 ECUs and
∆ID = 0 ECUs [19].
C. Normative component
Here we describe the normative component of the
model which implements the second block of assumptions
in Table I. We also define the entire utility function [see
Eq. (3)] for the specific case of the PD game.
The impact that social norms have on agent’s deci-
sions is a function of how salient [47, 48], i.e., relevant,
the norm is perceived by agent i at round t within the
social group. The higher the salience of the social norm,
the stronger its impact on the motivation to comply with
it. The norm salience is determined by two indepen-
dent factors, weighted with parameters wC , wO > 0, and
their interaction, weighted with parameter wI > 0, i.e.,
(cf. [47])
∆Ni(t) = wC [2si(t)− 1] +wO ni(t)
K
+wIsi(t)
ni(t)
K
. (5)
According to the first term, the salience of a norm is de-
termined by the behavior at round t, namely the agent’s
choice to comply with or violate the norm. If agent i com-
plies with the norm, she will perceive it as more salient
than if she violates it. This is justified by the fact that
humans have a strong need to enhance their self-concepts
by behaving consistently with their own beliefs and self-
ascribed habits so that they can avoid ethical dissonance
(self-consistency Refs. [49–51]).
Consistent with theoretical and empirical findings on
conditional cooperation [40, 52], the second term contain-
ing wO > 0 assumes that the salience of the norm is also
affected by the share of peers that complied with it. The
more peers comply with the norm, the more salient the
norm becomes, and vice-versa. The third term contain-
ing wI > 0 disappears if the agent did not cooperate at
round t (i.e., if si(t) = 0); while not present in Ref. [47],
this last term is introduced in this work to account for
recent experimental observations that support the MCC
rule. , which assumes that in taking decisions individu-
als are responsive to the behavior of others, but only if
they have cooperated themselves [53]. It can be noticed
that the second term relaxes the assumption behind the
MCC rule by positing that when deciding whether to co-
operate individuals are always sensitive to what others do
and not just after having cooperated themselves (social
influence). This relaxation is in line to recent findings
reported in Ref. [24].
Comparing Eqs. (4) and (5) we can see that the in-
formation required about neighbors’ action to estimate
norm salience, i.e., ni(t), could in principle be inferred
from the information on material payoffs. So, it is not
unreasonable to expect that agents can indirectly infer
normative information from material payoffs only, as sug-
gested by Horita et al. [24].
Now, introducing Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (3), we get
∆Ui(si, ni) = (asi + b)ni + 2hsi − h, (6)
here
a = hwI/K, b = (hwO +∆IC)/K, (7)
are effective parameters introduced to simplify the nota-
tion. We have dropped the index t to include explicitly
the dependence of ∆Ui on the number ni of agent i’s
7peers who cooperated at round t. Furthermore, we have
done wC = 1, as it can be absorbed in the parameter h,
and ∆ID = 0 as we will focus our analysis on the weak
PD game studied in Ref. [19].
V. SLOW ADAPTATION AND ABSENCE OF
NETWORK RECIPROCITY
Here we describe how to implement the third block of
assumptions in Table I and how to obtain an effective
four-parameter model of a single representative agent.
Our interest in such an effective model is that it allows for
the complete analytical characterization of its long term
dynamics, indicating the existence of critical phenomena,
while still quantitatively reproducing major features of
large-scale experiments with human groups.
As already discussed in Sec. II, the large-scale ex-
periments analyzed here are consistent with the as-
sumption that adaptation is slow in comparison to the
rate of change of individual strategic choices. Fluc-
tuations around agents’ average behavior induced by
their stochastic nature can then be neglected (see Ap-
pendix A). This so-called adiabatic [45, 46] approxima-
tion allows us to replace the stochastic variable si en-
coding the actual strategy chosen by each agent i for its
mean value xi, which is a deterministic quantity.
To see this, notice that introducing Eq. (2) into Eq. (1)
the system dynamics can be fully specified in terms of the
cooperation probability as
xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)
1−α
xi(t)1−α + [1− xi(t)]1−α e−β∆Ui(t)
. (8)
Replacing the stochastic term ∆Ui(t), which depends on
the actual actions si and s∂i of agent i and her neighbors
∂i (see Eq. (6)), by its average value ∆Ui(t), which is
obtained by changing each action sj by its corresponding
average xj , we get the deterministic equation
xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)
1−α
xi(t)1−α + [1− xi(t)]1−α e−β∆Ui(t)
. (9)
More precisely
∆Ui(t) =
∑
si,s∂i
∆U(si, ni) pi(si, t)
∏
j∈∂i
pj(sj , t)
=a xi(t)
∑
j∈∂i
xj(t) + b
∑
j∈∂i
xj(t) + 2hxi(t)− h,
(10)
where ni =
∑
j∈∂i sj , the term s∂i denotes the set of
strategies of i’s peers, pj(s, t) = [xj(t)]
s[1 − xj(t)]1−s is
the probability that agent j plays strategy s and we have
used the expression in Eq. (6).
On the other hand, the interaction structure of a hu-
man group does not appear to significantly influence its
cooperative behavior [19, 52, 54–56], this is usually re-
ferred to as ‘absence of network reciprocity’—network
reciprocity is the influence of network structure on co-
operative behavior [66]. Meaning that correlations be-
tween different agents can then be assumed to be weak.
This leads to a mean field approximation [27], where∑
j∈∂i xj ≈ xK. Here x is the global mean value of xi
calculated over all agents i, and K is the average number
of neighbors of a generic agent i. This approximation
allows us to describe the system in terms of a single rep-
resentative agent that captures the typical behavior of a
generic agent i. In this way, we obtain a deterministic
learning dynamics of a single representative agent given
by the equation (see Appendix A and the the first two
sections in the supporting information of [45] for further
details)
x(t+ 1) =
x(t)1−α
x(t)1−α + [1− x(t)]1−α e−β∆U[x(t)] , (11)
where x is the probability for the representative agent to
cooperate, and
∆U [x] = aK x2 + (bK + 2h)x− h, (12)
is obtained by replacing in Eq. (3) both si and ni/K with
the average value x. Equation (11) describes the relevant
aspects of the dynamics of the global cooperation level
and can reproduce the values observed in Ref. [19] with
accuracy comparable to more complex models [20, 67]
(see Sec. VII).
VI. DYNAMICAL REGIMES AND PHASE
DIAGRAM
Here we determine the phase diagram characteriz-
ing the long-term dynamics of the effective single-agent
model described in detail in the previous sections; this di-
agram shows three regimes—mono-stability, bi-stability,
and non-equilibrium—as well as a line of critical points.
To study the long-term dynamics of the model defined
in Eq. (11) we look for fixed points, i.e., points x that
satisfy x(t+ 1) = x(t) = x. The points at the boundary,
i.e., x = 0 and x = 1, are fixed points of the mean field
dynamics described by Eq. (11), but they are unstable
since α, β > 0. Only fixed points x∗ satisfying 0 < x∗ < 1
can be stable. The condition that these points satisfy can
be derived from Eq. (11) by doing x(t + 1) = x(t) = x,
which yields
x = f(x) with f(x) =
1
2
+
1
2
tanh
[
A(x− x0)2 + y0
]
,
(13)
where
A =
aK
2γ
, (14)
x0 = −bK + 2h
2 aK
, (15)
y0 = − (bK + 2h)
2
8 aKγ
− h
2γ
, (16)
8and γ = α/β. In Eq. (13) we have not made explicit the
dependence of the function f on the effective parameters
A, x0, and y0 to reduce clutter in the notation.
If the MCC assumption is dropped, i.e., wI = 0 so
a = 0, Eq. (13) becomes equivalent to the equation that
determines the equilibrium magnetization, given by m =
2x−1, of the Curie-Weiss model [68]. Indeed, when a = 0
Eq. (13) can be written as m = tanh [β(Jeffm+Heff)],
where Jeff = (hwO +∆IC + 2h)/4α would correspond to
an effective ferromagnetic interaction (when Jeff > 0)
and Heff = (hwO +∆IC)/4α would correspond to an ef-
fective external field. As it is well known, the Curie-
Weiss model can display two phases, paramagnetic and
ferromagnetic, which are the magnetic analogous of the
regimes of mono-stability and bi-stability of our model of
human cooperative dynamics.
The MCC assumption (wI > 0) introduces an addi-
tional non-linearity, whose magnetic analogous is an ad-
ditive term of order m2 in the argument of the hyper-
bolic tangent. Such term comes from the interaction be-
tween the agent’s own cooperative behavior and that of
her neighbors. Such additional non-linearity renders the
phase diagram of the model more complex and gives rise
to a new non-equilibrium phase, where the cooperative
dynamics never settles.
Indeed, as described in detail in Appendix B and shown
in Fig. 1, depending on the values of the parameters
A, x0, y0 there can be zero, one, or two stable fixed
points, corresponding to a non-equilibrium, mono-stable,
or bi-stable long-term dynamics, respectively. This pro-
vides an analytical characterization of the system that
helps to obtain insights about systems as complex as hu-
man groups that are typically difficult to obtain. In par-
ticular, this analytical characterization allows us to infer
model parameters from experimental data and identify
evidence that the human groups playing in the experi-
ments of Ref. [19] are near criticality (see Sec. VII and
Appendix E). The strategy we adopt here for the esti-
mation of model parameters from experiments uses in-
formation about the dynamical regimes identified.
The regions of the phase diagram corresponding to the
different dynamical regimes are separated by surfaces of
discontinuous transitions that terminate on a line of crit-
ical points (see Appendix B). At these critical points
correlations are known to become long-range [27] and
systems have been shown to display a multitude of sig-
nificant features, like large repertoire of dynamical re-
sponses, optimal transmission and storage of information,
and extreme sensitivity to external perturbations [26–36].
Several mechanisms have been put forward in an at-
tempt to explain how criticality could emerge in living
systems [30]. A novel perspective posits that criticality
is the evolutionary stable outcome of a group of individ-
uals equipped with mechanisms aimed at representing
each other with fidelity, wherein the best possible trade-
off between accuracy and flexibility is achieved [26]. We
here show evidence that mechanisms balancing between
individuality and social conformity can underlie human
cooperation.
Criticality is usually associated to the divergence of a
properly defined susceptibility that quantifies the range
of the correlations in the system and its response to ex-
ternal perturbations [27, 68]. Here it can be defined in
terms of the change in the global cooperation x when a
certain model parameter θ varies, e.g., θ = h. Out of the
non-equilibrium region it is given by (see Appendix D)
∂x
∂θ
∝ 1
A∗c −A
, (17)
which clearly diverges when A approaches a critical point,
described here by A∗c ; notice that A varies with the orig-
inal parameters of the model, since it is defined in terms
with them [see Eq. (14)].
In the concluding section, we discuss the implications
that this characteristic may have for the adaptiveness of
human groups.
VII. ANALYSIS OF LARGE-SCALE
EXPERIMENTS OF HUMANS PLAYING A
PRISONER’S DILEMMA
Here we use experimental data from Ref. [19] to deter-
mine the parameters of the effective single-agent model
described in Secs. II-V and locate the human group play-
ing in the experiment into the phase diagram obtained
in Sec. VI (see Fig. 1).
A. Brief review of experiments analyzed
To estimate where human groups may locate in the
phase diagram of Fig. 1, we extracted the model param-
eters from two recent large-scale experiments in which
more than 600 human participants play simultaneously
a Prisoner’s Dilemma game in two different network en-
vironments [19]. These experiments are aimed at testing
the relative effect of homogeneous or heterogeneous net-
works environments on cooperative behavior (for details
see Appendix E). We build on these experiments because
we expect them to offer more robust statistics than sim-
ilar, but smaller experiments.
In Ref. [19] one of the two experiments was conducted
on a square lattice and the other on a heterogeneous net-
work. However, their finding that network structure does
not significantly affect behavior (i.e., the absence of net-
work reciprocity) suggests that even though our mean
field model neglects network structure, it can still pro-
vide a good description of the experiments, as shown be-
low. In these experiments, human subjects played a 2×2
multi-player PD game with each of their K neighbors for
52 rounds. Players could take only one action—either to
cooperate (C) or defect (D)—the action being the same
against all opponents. The experiment was simultane-
ously carried out on two different virtual networks: the
first network consisted in a 25 × 25 lattice with a fixed
number of 4 neighbors and periodic boundary conditions
(625 subjects); the second network was a heterogeneous
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(Appendix E).
network with a fat-tailed degree distribution (604 sub-
jects), where the number of neighbors varied between 2
and 16.
Subjects played a repeated (weak) Prisoner’s Dilemma
game with all their neighbors for an initially undeter-
mined number of rounds. Payoffs were set to be 7 Exper-
imental Currency Units (ECUs) for mutual cooperation,
10 ECUs for a defector facing a cooperator, and 0 ECUs
for any player facing a defector.
Participants received information about the actions
and normalized payoffs of their neighbors in the previ-
ous round. Without knowledge of the duration of the
game, participants had to make only one decision for
all neighbors. Therefore, the situation becomes similar
to a repeated public goods game. In public goods ex-
periments, participants usually start highly cooperative,
but in the absence of cooperation-enhancing mechanisms,
such as punishment or reputation, their cooperation lev-
els decreases over time. Information about the behavior
of others allows participants to create expectations about
how others will behave, namely about the social norms
ruling the group.
We focus here on two features observed in these ex-
periments that can be reproduced by our model (Fig. 2).
The first feature is the dynamics of the global cooper-
ation level, which decays from an initial value of about
60% to a relatively constant value of about 35%, both
on the heterogeneous network and on the square lattice
[Fig. 2(a) and (b)]. The second feature is the probability
(P ) for a generic individual to Cooperate (C) or to De-
fect (D) in a round, conditioned by her previous action
s and the number n of neighbors who cooperated in the
previous round [19, 52, 54–56]. We denote this probabil-
ity by P (C|s, n). Ref. [19], for instance, reports a nearly
linear dependence of P (C|s, n) from n, for both values
of s [see Fig. 2(c) and (d)].
B. Inference of model parameters
To fit our model to the experimental data,
we notice that the left hand side of Eq. (1)
for the representative agent can be interpreted as
x(t+ 1) = P (C, t+ 1|s, n, x, t), namely the probability
that the agent cooperates at round t + 1 given that at
round t the following three conditions are satisfied: (i)
she played strategy s, (ii) n of her neighbors cooperated,
and (iii) x(t) = x. To eliminate the explicit dependence
on the history of the system, i.e., on x and t, we first as-
sume that the system of interacting humans observed in
the laboratory has reached a stationary state, so that it
can be accurately described by the long-term mean field
dynamics [Eq. (11)]. We further assume that the system
is essentially mono-stable and, accordingly, the model dy-
namics is dominated by a single fixed point. These as-
sumptions considerably simplify the analysis and, as it
turns out, are self-consistent with the results obtained
(see Appendix E for a detailed treatment).
Although the stationary state of a generic system can
depend on its dynamical history, under the above as-
sumptions this is not the case. Thus, the right hand side
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FIG. 2. Balance of selfishness and conformity to social norms explains human behavior in large-scale Prisoner’s Dilemma
games (a, b). Comparison of the dynamics of the global cooperation level observed in the laboratory experiment conducted
in Zaragoza [19] (circles) on an heterogeneous network (a) and on a square lattice (b) with that predicted by Eq. (11) (line)
with the corresponding parameters inferred from the same experiments (see caption of Fig. 1). The model and experimental
dynamics are in agreement even in the transient regime. (c, d) Probability for a representative agent to cooperate in a generic
round based on whether she cooperated (C, squares) or defected (D, circles) and on the number of neighbors who cooperated
in the previous round obtained in the same experiments [19] on an heterogeneous network (c) and on a lattice (d). The
experimental data is compared with the values predicted by Eq. (18) (lines) with the corresponding parameters inferred from
the same experiments (see caption of Fig. 1). We can see that the assumption of linearity is valid and that our model agrees with
the experimental values to a large extent. We include the linear fits (dashed straight lines) directly obtained from experimental
data [19] for comparison.
of Eq. (1) evaluated at the fixed point, i.e.,
P (C|s, n) = 1
1 + y1−α1 e
−β∆U(s,n)
, (18)
should coincide with the experimental results, where
y1 = (1− x1) /x1, and x1 is the global cooperation level
at the dominant stable fixed point. The term ∆U(s, n)
is the utility function of the representative agent in the
mean field approximation, which is obtained by sim-
ply dropping the agent index i in Eq. (6). Similarly,
y1 = (1− x1) /x1, with x1 being the only stable fixed
point of Eq. (11). This result indicates that when the
system is deterministic and monostable its long-term dy-
namics is independent of its history. When the system
is bistable and we neglect fluctuations altogether, the
probability P (C|s, n) is given instead by a convex com-
bination of terms like the one on the right hand side of
Eq. (18), one for each fixed point. More details can be
found in Appendix D 1.
To compare Eq. (18) with the nearly linear behav-
ior [Figs. 2(c) and 2(d)] observed in [19, 55] (but see
Ref. [56]), we do a first order approximation in β to ob-
tain
P (C|s, n) = msn/K + rs, (19)
with
ms = βKJ(α)(as + b), (20)
rs = I(α) + βJ(α) [h(2s− 1)] ; (21)
this approximation is consistent with the results below
(see Fig. 2).
The slopes ms and intercepts rs in Eq. (19) are better
described in terms of the mean intercept r and the ‘gap’G
between intercepts of the near linear trends that describe
the MCC rule [19], i.e.,
r =
1
2
(rC + rD) = I(α), (22)
G = rC − rD = 2βhwCJ(α), (23)
where, for convenience, we have donem0 ≡ mD, r1 ≡ rC ,
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etc.; here
I(α) ≡ 1
1 + y1−α1
, (24)
J(α) ≡ y
1−α
1(
1 + y1−α1
)2 . (25)
In experiments we have mD 6= 0, which implies b 6= 0
as mD ∝ b, so
mC −mD = β aKJ(α), (26)
mC
mD
=
β a+ β b
β b
. (27)
We are now in a better position to discuss the role
played by the parameters wC , wO, wI encoding the nor-
mative assumptions. First, notice that we have re-
introduced parameter wC = 1 in Eq. (23) to make ex-
plicit that if the assumption of self-consistency (see Ta-
ble I) were dropped, i.e., if we did wC = 0, the gap
G would vanish, contradicting experimental observations
(see Fig. 2). Analogously, we can see from Eq. (26) that
if the MCC assumption (see Table I) were dropped, i.e.,
if we did wI = 0 which implies a = 0, the two slopes
mC = mD are equal, contradicting experimental obser-
vations (see Fig. 2). In this sense, parameters wI and
wC play not only a quantitative but also a qualitative
role. In contrast, the role of parameter wO is more
quantitative than qualitative. Indeed, Eq. (20) implies
that mD = βKJ(α)b. If wO = 0 we have b = ∆IC/K,
which is fixed by the experimental conditions, and mD =
βJ(α)∆IC would be less than zero for the PD game, since
∆IC < 0; this is consistent with experimental observa-
tions. However, with wO = 0 the accuracy of the fit was
rather poor and so we did not include it in our analysis.
However, future analysis should study in further detail
the relevance of this assumption.
As described in detail in Appendix D2, there is a direct
relationship between the parameters of the model and the
experimental quantities defined above [see Eqs. (D27)-
(D30)]. So, the values of ms and rs, extracted from ex-
perimental data [19] (see Table II), constraint the values
of the model parameters. There is a further constraint:
the dynamics of the global cooperation level should be
consistent with experimental results [Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)].
A population of parameters satisfying the resulting set
of constraints was obtained via Bayesian inference by us-
ing the package pomp [69] and is illustrated in Fig. 1. Al-
though the 2D projection of the phase diagram in Fig. 1
may suggest otherwise, they all lie on the region of mono-
stability. The technical details and the data obtained are
provided in Appendix E.
C. Results
The parameters corresponding to the two experiments
(see Table IV), inferred by the method described above
(see also Appendix E), are at a relative distance of 3%
and 11% to the critical line (see Fig. 1 and Appendix E).
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) compare the levels of global co-
operation observed in the laboratory experiment [19] (cir-
cles) with the ones predicted by Eq. (8) (line), informed
with values extracted from Ref. [19]. Results from both
the heterogeneous [Fig. 2(a)] and homogeneous [Fig. 2(b)]
networks are presented. Both figures show a decay in co-
operation over the 52 rounds from the initial value of 60%
to around 35% in both treatments. Results show a close
agreement of the model dynamics with the laboratory
experiments. Likewise in Ref. [19], the network topology
does not have any appreciable influence in the evolution
of the level of cooperation.
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show the probability for a rep-
resentative agent to cooperate in a generic round based
on whether she cooperated (C, squares) or defected (D,
circles) and on the number of neighbors who cooperated
in the previous round. Results obtained in both the het-
erogeneous network [Fig. 2(c)] and lattice [Fig. 2(d)] are
shown. Again, both figures indicate that the probability
defined in Eq. (18) is consistent with both the experi-
ments and the linear approximation in Eq. (19).
Our model reproduces human cooperative behavior ob-
served in large-scale laboratory experiments more accu-
rately than the MCC behavioral rule, since, as shown
in [19, 53], the latter is not able to reproduce the slow
decay of the cooperation level when the agents did not
cooperate in the immediate past.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented a statistical physics based
model to account for human decision processes behind
cooperative behavior. In this model, the decision makers’
utility is based both on the material rewards they obtain
and on the degree to which their actions comply with
social norms. Results from this analytically tractable
model are in agreement with observations from recent
large-scale experiments with humans [19]. The model
closely reproduces both the global cooperation level and
the final distribution of agents according to their prob-
ability of cooperation. This provides support to our hy-
pothesis that human cooperation is the outcome of the
interaction between instrumental decision-making, aimed
to maximize people’s economic rewards, and the norm
psychology humans are endowed with. In doing so, we
have provided experimental evidence of the effect of so-
cial norms in promoting cooperative behavior in large
groups of humans facing a social dilemma situation.
The cognitively inspired model presented encapsulates
important empirical knowledge on human cooperative
behavior: i) humans’ social strategic behavior operates
with both model-free and model-based reinforcement
learning [14, 44] that are at the basis of the EWA frame-
work adopted; ii) population structure does not signifi-
cantly influence the cooperative outcome [19, 52, 54–56]
that in the model led to a mean field approximation; iii)
adaptation is slow when compared with the time scale
at which individual actions change, which allows us to
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neglect in the model stochastic fluctuations and obtain a
deterministic dynamics [see Appendix A and Eq. (11)].
The presented model is parsimonious enough to allow
for a detailed characterization of its long-term dynamics.
By inferring the model’s parameters from experimental
data extracted from Ref. [19], we show that the cooper-
ative system is located near criticality.
Recently, evidence has been mounting that living sys-
tems, like human brain, insect swarms, gene expression
networks, bird flocks, and fish schools [27–31] operate
near critical points and this might provide them func-
tional advantages. Far from criticality a system can be
either too stable, which may favor maladaptive behav-
iors, or too uncoordinated with its members behaving es-
sentially interdependent of each other. In both extremes
the system as a whole is not very responsive to external
changes, while around a critical point it is strongly cor-
related and highly sensitive to changes and its capacity
to respond efficiently to varying external conditions can
be maximized [26].
Even though still preliminary, our evidence of signa-
tures of criticality in human cooperative groups is in
agreement with recent findings on socio-ecological sys-
tems showing that social norms enhance the adaptiveness
of cooperative systems to social and environmental vari-
ability [4, 70]. These studies report that during times of
institutional and ecological volatility, social norms facil-
itates the management of common resources like forests,
water, fisheries, more than the action of formal institu-
tions. The long-range correlations between pairs of hu-
man subjects associated to a critical point could then
help explain why norm-based cooperation may enhance
the adaptiveness of human groups to external change.
Social norms are then crucial mechanisms for both pro-
moting cooperation and enhancing its resilience to exter-
nal perturbation.
Clearly, more theoretical and empirical work is needed
to reach solid conclusions. For example, machine learn-
ing techniques, like the maximum entropy approach in
Refs. [29, 71–73], can be used to carry out a complemen-
tary data-driven analysis that does not rely on expert
knowledge as the model we presented here. Moreover,
experiments that vary some of the relevant parameters
of the model, e.g., the payoff matrices, specifically tar-
geted to more directly address our findings need to be
performed.
However, the increasing number of similar evi-
dence [27–32, 34–36] attesting criticality in living systems
seems to support the plausibility of our results. Similarly
to ants [28], human groups appear to reach optimal co-
ordination at a suitable trade-off between individuality
and social conformity [28], and this makes them to poise
at the critical point. Social conformity increases the abil-
ity of a group to coordinate to reach the desired collec-
tive outcome. However, behavioral conformism has also
the disadvantage of increasing the stability of undesirable
behaviors and of decreasing the ability of the system to
react to external information [28]. Thus the optimal col-
lective performance is achieved when group members are
able to balance between social conformism and individ-
uality, so that they are able to achieve a high level of
coordination within the group, but also to maintain a
robust responsiveness to external perturbations.
How would humans tune to criticality? An intrigu-
ing possibility is that humans implicitly build a model
and adjust its parameters accordingly, similar in a sense
to what we did here. Model-based inference techniques
apparently tend to produce parameter values that are
close to a critical point [74]. Model-based learning mech-
anisms in humans [14, 43] could then influence their be-
havior and drive human groups towards criticality [26].
Human subjects hardly possess global structural infor-
mation about their group, which may explain why the
mean field model developed here is accurate enough, and
ultimately why no significant impact of population struc-
ture on cooperative behavior has been observed [55]. An
alternative idea [28, 32] posits that biological groups can
tune to criticality by growing until a suitable size. If so,
it may be difficult to observe signatures of criticality in
experimental setups with human groups of fixed size.
Another interesting question that arises is whether
there may be a connection between the signatures of crit-
icality observed here in a group of decision makers and
those that have been observed in the brains powering the
decision making itself [29, 36, 72].
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Appendix A: Slow adaptation and adiabatic
approximation
A way to justify the approach leading to Eqs. (9) and
(10) in the main text is assuming that the cooperation
probability, or equivalently the drive in Eq. (2), changes
slowly during a batch of about T rounds [45, 75, 76]. For
small values of T , a linear noise correction to the deter-
ministic equation give good results even for a number of
players as small as two [75]. Since we are interested here
in games with hundreds of players and we are focusing
exclusively on observed experimental features at the ag-
gregate level, namely the global level of cooperation and
the MCC rule, we take T = 1 and neglect the noise al-
together. This approach is expected to be better suited
for games with a sufficient large number of agents and
is not expected to necessarily described the initial tran-
sient regime in sufficient detail. As discussed in the main
text, this approach can actually describe the major fea-
tures of the largest experiment to date [19] with enough
qualitative and quantitative detail.
If α and β both vanish, the probability of cooperation
remains constant. We will thus assume that α and β are
small so that changes in the drive during a few rounds
are not appreciable. The accumulated changes will then
only become noticeable after each batch of T rounds;
these can be written as
Di(t+T ) = (1−α)TDi(t)+
T−1∑
k=0
(1−α)k∆Ui(t+k). (A1)
Here the sum is over the T consecutive rounds that start
at round t. We can re-write Eq. (A1) as
Di(t+ T )
T
= (1−α′)Di(t)
T
+
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(1−α′)k/T∆Ui(t+k),
(A2)
where α′ = 1− (1−α)T ≈ αT , since α is assumed small.
For large values of the batch size T , we can interpret
the sum in the right hand side of Eq. (A2) as a weighted
time average. The weight is given by a discounting factor
(1 − α′)k/T which decreases from 1 to 1 − α′ from the
beginning (k = 0) to end (k = T − 1) of the batch,
respectively. So, if we further assume that also α′ ≈ αT
is small, we can approximate such a sum by the ensemble
average in Eq. (10) calculated with the corresponding
mixed strategies [45, 75, 76].
Replacing the last term in Eq. (A2) with the term de-
fined in Eq. (10) and writing everything in terms of a
rescaled time τ ≡ t/T and a rescaled drive D′i(τ) =
Di(τ T )/T and utility differences ∆U
′
i(τ) = ∆Ui(τ T )/T ,
we obtain
D′i(τ + 1) = (1− α′)D′i(τ) + ∆U ′i(τ). (A3)
Following Eqs. (1) and (A3), and the definitions τ ≡
t/T and x′(τ) ≡ x(τT ), we can write
x(t+ T ) = x′(τ + 1) =
1
1 + e−βD
′
i(τ+1)
. (A4)
In terms of a rescaled parameter β′ = βT , we obtain an
equation analogous to Eq. (8) but for updates on batches
of T rounds, i.e.
x′i(τ + 1) =
x′i(τ)
1−α′
x′i(τ)
1−α′ + [1− x′i(τ)]1−α′e−β′∆U ′i(τ)
,
(A5)
where, introducing Eq. (6) into Eq. (10), for the case
of the Weak Prisoner’s Dilemma we are interested in we
have
∆U ′i(τ) = ax
′
i(τ)
∑
j∈∂i
x′j(τ) + b
∑
j∈∂i
x′j(τ) + 2hx
′
i(τ) − h.
(A6)
Eq. (A5) is a deterministic update rule obtained by ne-
glecting the fluctuations in the last term in Eq. (A2),
which is stochastic, and replacing it with the average in
Eq. (10). Finally, notice that since we assumed α′ is small
then α ≈ α′/T should be even smaller. Notice also that
in this case the ratio α′/β′ = α/β remains the same.
If we take T = 1 then τ = t, so we can replace
x′i(τ) → xi(t) and ∆U ′(t) → ∆Ui(t) in Eq. (A6). Sim-
ilarly, we can replace α′ → α and β′ → β. This yields
Eqs. (9) and (10) above.
Appendix B: Calculation of the phase diagram
Here we show that Eq. (11) indeed predicts three
regimes with qualitatively different long-term dynamics:
mono-stable, bi-stable, and non-equilibrium.
Graphically, the solutions of Eq. (13) correspond to the
intersections of the graphs of f and the identity function
at points x that satisfy 0 < x < 1. Their stability is
determined by the magnitude of the derivative of f , i.e.
f ′(x) ≡ ∂f(x)
∂x
=
A (x− x0)
cosh2 [A(x− x0)2 + y0]
, (B1)
evaluated at the corresponding intersection point x: If
|f ′(x)| < 1 (respectively, |f ′(x)| > 1), then the fixed
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point is stable (respectively, unstable). We have used
partial rather than total derivative in Eq. (B1) to stress
that f is also a function of A, x0 and y0.
We now proceed to derive the equations that define
the surfaces separating the different regimes which, as
we will see, are accompanied by a line of critical points.
For clarity, we will first give a somewhat informal discus-
sion before addressing the problem in more detail below.
Notice that Eq. (13) is similar to the one yielding the
equilibrium magnetization in the mean field Ising model
on an external field. In analogy with the analysis of the
Ising model, and following the discussion in the previous
paragraph, the condition |f ′(x)| = 1 plays a central role
in determining the transition between different regimes.
Using Eq. (B1), the condition |f ′(x)| = 1 yields
√
A |z| = cosh2 (z2 + y0) , (B2)
where z =
√
A(x − x0). Using Eq. (B2), rewriting the
definition of z as x0 = x − z/
√
A, and using Eq. (13) to
change x for f(x), we can write
Ad(z, y0) =
cosh4
(
z2 + y0
)
z2
, (B3)
x0(z, y0) =
1
2
+
1
2
tanh
(
z2 + y0
)− z√
Ad(z, y0)
.(B4)
from which we can obtain in parametric form the surface
Ad(x0, y0) that separates the three dynamical regimes,
as a function of x0 and y0 with parameter z (Fig. 1
(a)). Fig. 3 shows a level curve of this surface, which
is the set of points that satisfies Ad(x0, y0) = A, with
A = 5. This value allows for a better visualization, while
the discussion that follows remains qualitatively true for
the case in Fig. 1 discussed in the main text, where the
parameters inferred from the experiment [19] were used
instead.
To fix ideas before we continue with a more formal
description, we first show a more graphical discussion
following Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. For this we fix parameters
A = 5 and y0 = −1, and vary x0 moving from left to right
along the horizontal dashed line in Fig. 3. This figure
shows five different points labeled Rℓ (with ℓ = 1, . . . 5)
on the said horizontal dashed line, which illustrate the
five regions to be discussed next. Fig. 4 depicts the re-
spective functions f(x) for A = 5, y0 = −1, at each of
the five values of x0 that correspond to the five points
Rℓ in Fig. 3. Notice that f(x) always takes its minimum
value at x = x0. We have also identified four points, la-
beled Pℓ (with ℓ = 1, . . . 4), where the magnitude of the
slope of f is exactly one, i.e., f ′(P1) = f
′(P2) = 1 and
f ′(P3) = f
′(P4) = −1 (see for example Fig. 4a). Starting
at R1 (Fig. 4a), we can then shift f(x) (in red) towards
the right by increasing x0, and when each of the four Pℓ
points hit the graph of the identity function (dashed line)
they become fixed points x with |f ′(x)| = 1 (i.e., neither
stable nor unstable).
We now describe the different ways in which the iden-
tity function can intercept the graph of f . Referring to
the sequence in Figs. 4(a)-(e), we can imagine that we
start from x0 < −0.1 (Fig. 4a) and slowly increase its
value so that the function f slowly moves from left to
right traversing the conditions corresponding to the five
points Rℓ (with ℓ = 1, . . . 5) in Fig. 3. In this process we
traverse the following five regions:
Region 1: Initially x0, where f takes its minimum
value, is negative enough to cause the graph of the
identity function to intersect f at a single point
x1 ≈ 1 [see Fig. 4(a)]. Since f ′(x1) ≈ 0, the fixed
point x1 is stable. Then, if we start increasing the
value of x0, the graph of f will move to the right
and the value of x1 will decrease until the graphs of
f (red solid line) and the identity function (dashed
line) intersect at point P1 (see Fig. 4a) and that
situation will mark the end of Region 1. Point R1
in Fig. 3 belongs to this region.
Region 2: From then on, a second stable fixed point
x2 emerges along with an unstable fixed point xu,
with x2 < xu < x1 [see Fig. 4(b)]. Increasing the
value of x0 further, these fixed points shift to the
left until x1 hits point P2 [see Fig. 4(b)], and then
disappears. This can only happen if the curvature
of the graph of f is not too large. Point R2 in Fig. 3
belongs to this second region.
Region 3: Afterwards, there is only one stable fixed
point x2 which shifts to the left while we keep in-
creasing the value of x0, until it hits point P3 [see
Fig. 4(c)], to then become unstable. This can only
happen if the curvature of the graph of f is not too
large. Point R3 in Fig. 3 belongs to this region.
Region 4: After this, there is only one fixed point xu,
which is unstable, that shifts to the left when in-
creasing the value of x0, until it hits a point P4,
where f ′(P4) = −1 [see Fig. 4(d)]. Point R4 in
Fig. 3 belongs to this region.
Region 5: In this last regime, there is only one stable
fixed point x1 which keeps shifting to the left while
we increase further the value of x0 [see Fig 4(e)].
Point R5 in Fig. 3 belongs to this region.
Following the comments made in the description of re-
gions 2 and 3 above, when the curvature of the graph of
f is large enough the order in which points P2 and P3
in Fig. 4 meet gets inverted. However, the experimental
results are not located in this regime and so we do not
discuss this further.
In Fig. 3, the level curve Ad(x0, y0) = A defines regions
inside which there are zero (blue parabolic-like area) and
two (green triangular-like area) stable fixed points. These
regions terminate on a critical point (red circles), where
a continuous transition takes place. By varying the value
of A, we can change those regions and the corresponding
critical points, which then gives rise to lines of critical
points (red dashed lines). One condition satisfied by a
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critical point is that there are only two points (instead
of four) where the slope of f has magnitude one; one of
those points is the reflection of the other around x = x0.
This is the case if Eq. (B2) has only one solution z∗ > 0,
since this implies a second solution −z∗ by the symmetry
of Eq. (B2) under reflections z → −z. The condition for
Eq. (B2) to have a unique positive solution is that the
slope of the function g(z) = cosh2(z2 + y0) on its right
hand side equals
√
A, i.e.,
√
A = g′(z) ≡ 4z sinh(z2 + y0) cosh(z2 + y0). (B5)
We can safely assume that A 6= 0 and divide Eq. (B5) by
Eq. (B2) for z > 0 to obtain the equation 4z2 tanh(z2 +
y0) = 1, from which we can obtain y0c(z), i.e., the crit-
ical value of y0 as a function of z (see Eq. (B6) be-
low). Knowing this, we can use Eq. (B3) and Eq. (B4)
to obtain Ac(z) and x0c(z), i.e., the corresponding
critical values of A and x0 as a function of z (see
Eqs. (B7) and (B8) below). More explicitly, the critical
lines (Ac(z), x0c(z), y0c(z)) are described by the following
equations
y0c(z) = tanh
−1
(
1
4z2
)
− z2, (B6)
Ac(z) =
cosh4
[
z2 + y0c(z)
]
z2
, (B7)
x0c(z) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
4 z2
)
− z√
Ac(z)
, (B8)
where we have used the condition for criticality, i.e.,
4z2 tanh(z2 + y0) = 1, to obtain Eq. (B8).
In all the discussion so far the condition |f ′(x)| = 1 has
played a central role. Here we show in a more detailed
way why this is the case. First, notice that the function
f in Eq. (13) essentially contains a parabola given by the
expressionA(x − x0)2 + y0 and transforms it by applying
a hyperbolic tangent, a constant scaling, and a constant
offset (both equal to 1/2) to it. The parameter A defines
the curvature of the parabola, while the parameters y0
and x0 define the minimum value it takes and where it
takes it, respectively. These features remain qualitatively
true for the graph of f , except that now y0 also influences
its curvature. Now, notice that the graph of the function
f in Eq. (13) has the following properties (see Fig. 4):
Property 1: It is continuous and bounded, i.e., 0 ≤
f(x) ≤ 1 for all x.
Property 2: It is symmetric around x = x0,
where it takes its minimum value, i.e.,
f(x0 − x) = f(x0 + x) for x0 = argminx f(x).
Property 3: Starting from x = x0 and moving to-
wards x > x0 (respectively, x < x0), its
slope monotonously increases (respectively, de-
creases) from zero up to a certain point, where
its second derivative f ′′ vanishes, and then
starts decreasing (respectively, increasing) until it
asymptotically reaches zero again. In particular
limx→±∞ f
′(x) = 0.
Property 4: By varying x0 it is translated horizontally
but otherwise its shape remains unchanged. In par-
ticular, this implies that f ′(x) depends only on the
difference x− x0, as observed in Eq. (B1).
According to properties 1 and 4, the graph of the function
f in Eq. (13) can intersect with the graph of the identity
function in any of its points, by choosing a proper value
of x0 (see Fig. 4). Furthermore, due to properties 3 and 4,
we can always find a value of x0 for which there is at least
one stable fixed point, since the function f always has
points with slopes as close to zero as necessary. Now, due
to the continuity of f , if there are only two stable fixed
points, say x1 and x2 < x1, then there is an unstable fixed
point, say xu, such that x2 < xu < x1 [see Fig. 4(b)].
In this case, because of the shape of f [see Fig. 4(b)],
the unstable fixed point xu and at least one of the two
stable fixed points should be on the right side of x0, i.e.,
x1 > xu > x0. Following properties 1 and 3, if there is
an unstable fixed point xu such that xu > x0, there must
also be two points where the slope of f is equal to one;
this is due to the fact that for x > x0 we have f
′(x) > 0
and f ′(x) goes to zero for both x = x0 and x → ∞,
furthermore, f ′(xu) > 1. Hence, the existence of a point
x with f ′(x) > 1 signals also the existence of at least one
value of the parameter x0 for which there are two stable
fixed points [see Fig. 4(b)]. Since f is symmetric around
x = x0, this also implies the existence of a point x
′ such
that f(x′) < −1. The first time this happens is when a
point x with |f ′(x)| = 1 emerges.
Appendix C: A diverging susceptibility
The susceptibility χ of a system is related to its re-
sponse to a small change in the external conditions. We
could ask what is the change δx in the global level of
cooperation when a generic parameter θ of the model is
varied by a small amount δθ. We have δx ≈ (∂x/∂θ)δθ,
so χ = ∂x/∂θ. Arguably the most natural parameters
to consider in our model are ∆IC introduced in Eq. (4),
which is in principle under the influence of the exper-
imenter, and perhaps also h [65]; these two parameters
influence the effective parameters x0 and y0 (see Eqs. (15)
and (16)). Since f in Eq. (13) depends explicitly on the
parameters A, x0, and y0 any change in a generic param-
eter θ that affects any of those three parameters would
also affect f . To be more specific, let us assume that
A = A(θ), x0 = x0(θ), and y0 = y0(θ), are well-behaved
functions of θ.
Deriving both sides of Eq. (13) with respect to a
generic parameter θ we obtain
χ =
∂x
∂θ
= f ′(x)
∂x
∂θ
+
∂f(x)
∂θ
, (C1)
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FIG. 3. A level curve of the surface Ad(x0, y0) of discontinu-
ous transitions (see Eqs. (B3) and (B4)), i.e., Ad(x0, y0) = A
(here A = 5). Inside the green triangular-like region (left)
there are two stable fixed points. Inside the blue parabolic-
like region (right) there are no stable fixed points. In all the
remaining white area there is one stable fixed point. These
regions terminate on critical points (red circles). If the value
of A changes, these regions shift and so do the corresponding
critical points along the critical lines (red dashed lines). The
points R1, . . . , R5 on the black dashed horizontal line show ex-
amples of the five regions described in the text (see Sec. B).
These correspond to parameter values A = 5, y0 = −1, and
x0 = −0.90, 0.00, 0.35 , 0.80, 1.62, respectively
where f ′(x) is defined in Eq. (B1), and the additional
term
∂f(x)
∂θ
=
∂f(x)
∂A
∂A(θ)
∂θ
+
∂f(x)
∂x0
∂x0(θ)
∂θ
+
∂f(x)
∂y0
∂y0(θ)
∂θ
,
(C2)
takes into account the explicit dependence of f on the
parameters of the model, which vary when varying θ.
The term defined in Eq. (C2) is smooth as long as we
can assume, as we do here, that there are no spurious
singularities in the definition of A(θ), x0(θ), and y0(θ).
Solving Eq. (C1) for the susceptibility χ = ∂x/∂θ we
get
χ =
1
1− f ′(x)
∂f(x)
∂θ
, (C3)
which clearly diverges when, by varying θ, the fixed point
x under consideration crosses continuously a point xc
where f ′(xc) = 1, i.e., a critical point. For illustration
purposes, let us assume that the model parameters vary
as A(θ) = A∗c − θ, x0(θ) = x∗0c, and y0(θ) = y∗0c, for
a generic parameter θ ≥ 0; here A∗c = Ac(z∗), x∗0c =
x0c(z
∗), and y∗0c = y0c(z
∗) correspond to a point on the
critical line specified by a particular value of z∗ through
Eqs. (B6), (B7), and (B8). Using Eqs. (B1) and (B7),
we can write f ′(x) =
√
A(θ)/A∗c , which for small θ can
be approximated as f ′(x) ≈ 1 − θ/2A∗c . So, following
Eq. (C3), when approaching the critical point, i.e., θ → 0
or A→ A∗c , the susceptibility diverges as
χ ∝ 1
θ
=
1
A∗c −A
−−−−→
A→A∗c
∞, (C4)
where in the last expression we have written θ = A∗c −A
in terms of A. The divergence of the susceptibility is one
of the hallmarks of criticality [27].
Appendix D: Connection to experiments
1. Moody conditional cooperation
As mentioned in the main text, experiments show that
the probability for a human to cooperate in a generic
round of the game depends on whether she cooperated
or not and how many of her peers cooperated. Here we
explain how to connect this so-called moody conditional
cooperation (MCC) rule with the mean field model de-
scribed by Eq. (11).
Indeed, the MCC rule can be expressed math-
ematically in terms of the conditional probability
P (C; t+ 1|s, n; t) for a generic agent to cooperate (C)
at round t+ 1 given that she played strategy s and that
n of her peers cooperated at round t. More precisely, the
probability which the MCC rule refers to can be writ-
ten as P (C|s, n) = (1/T )∑t P (C; t+ 1|s, n; t), where T
is the total number of rounds. We assume, however, that
T is sufficiently large and that the system reaches a sta-
tionary state. In this case, the MCC rule is given by the
conditional probability corresponding to the stationary
state (t→∞), and we can drop the index t; we will keep
the dependence on t for the most part to facilitate the
discussion, though. We further assume that the station-
ary state can be described by the long term dynamics of
the mean field model.
Depending on the context, we will use interchangeably
s =C or s = 1 to refer to cooperation, and similarly
we will use interchangeably s = D or s = 0 to refer to
defection.
Now, writing ∆Ui(t) = ∆Ui(si, ni) (see Eq. (6)), the
right hand side of Eq. (8) gives the probability that an
agent i cooperates at round t+ 1 given that, at round t,
she played strategy si, that ni =
∑
j∈∂i sj of her peers
cooperated, and that her cooperation probability was xi.
Indeed this is a more detailed reading of Eq. (8). Since
in the mean field approximation we are interested in a
representative agent, we can drop the indexes and write
P (C; t+ 1|s, n, x; t) = x
1−α
x1−α + (1− x)1−α e−β∆U(s,n) ,
(D1)
where ∆U(s, n) = (as+ b)n+ 2hs− h (see Eq. (6)).
This conditional probability distribution depends on
x, while the MCC rule does not. Informally, if we as-
sume that the system is mono-stable we can get rid of
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FIG. 4. Graph of f (see Eq. (13)) corresponding to points R1, . . . , R5 in Fig. 3 (see Sec. B). Notice that f(P1) = f(P2) = 1
and f(P3) = f(P4) = −1 (green crosses). The fixed points of f are its intersections with the identity function (dashed line);
these are stable (blue circles) if |f ′(x)| < 1 and unstable (black crosses) if |f ′(x)| > 1. a. For small x0 (e.g., point R1 in Fig 3),
there is only one stable fixed point x1. b. Increasing x0 (e.g., point R2 in Fig. 3) until point P1 touches the identity function,
we enter region 2 where there are two stable fixed points x1 and x2, and an unstable one xu in between. c. Increasing x0 (e.g.,
point R3 in Fig. 3) until x1 hits point P2 to then disappear, we enter region 3 where only the stable fixed point x2 survives.
d. Increasing x0 (e.g., point R4 in Fig. 3) until x2 hits the point P3 to become unstable, we enter region 4 where there are no
stable fixed points. e. Increasing x0 (e.g., point R5 in Fig. 3) until xu hits point P4 to become stable, we enter region 5 where
there is only one stable fixed point x1.
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the dependence on x to obtain
P (C|s, n) = 1
1 + y1−α1 e
−β∆U(s,n)
, (D2)
where y1 = (1 − x1)/x1, and x1 is the only stable fixed
point; Eq. (D2) coincides with Eq. (10) in the main text.
In the following we use the rules of probability theory
to obtain a more general form of P (C|s, n) from Eq. (D1)
that reduces to Eq. (D2) if we assume that the system is
mono-stable. Let us first write
P (C; t+ 1|s, n; t) =
∫ 1
0
P ({C; t+ 1}, {s, n, x; t})dx∫ 1
0 P (s, n, x; t)dx
,
(D3)
by definition of conditional probability. The term inside
the integral in the numerator is the joint probability of
all the variables involved. We have emphasized between
brackets which round the variables refer to. On the other
hand, the term inside the integral in the denominator is
the joint probability of all the variables that refer only
to round t.
Using the chain rule of probability theory we can ex-
press such joint probabilities as
P ({C; t+ 1}, {s, n, x; t}) = P (C; t+ 1|s, n, x; t)×
× P (s, n; t|x; t)P (x; t), (D4)
P (s, n, x; t) = P (s, n; t|x; t)P (x; t), (D5)
Let N denote the set of neighbors of the representative
agent, and let sN = {sj|j ∈ N} and xN = {xj |j ∈ N} be
the set of their strategies and cooperation probabilities,
respectively. Then
P (s, n; t|x; t) =
∑
sN
P (s, sN ; t|x; t) δ

n = ∑
j∈N
sj

 ,
(D6)
where δ[p] is the indicator function, which is equal to
one if proposition p is true and zero otherwise. Here
P (s, sN ; t|x; t) is the conditional probability that the
representative agent play strategy s and her peers play
strategies sN , jointly, at round t given that the probabil-
ity for the representative agent to cooperate at the same
round is x. The definition of conditional probability and
the chain rule allow us to write
P (s, sN ; t|x; t) =
∫ 1
0 P (s, sN ; t|x, xN ; t)P (x, xN ; t)
∏
j∈N dxj
P (x; t)
, (D7)
where the term inside the integral in the numerator is the
joint probability that at round t the representative agent
and her neighbors play strategies s and sN and their
cooperation probabilities are x and xN , respectively. The
integral marginalizes this probability over xN leaving the
joint probability of the variables s, sN , and x.
Although the next sentence may be redundant, its sole
intention is to put everything in the formalism we are
describing here: The probability that an agent plays
strategy s at round t, given that the probability to co-
operate at the same round t is x, can be written as
P (s; t|x; t) = xs(1 − x)1−s. Furthermore, at each round
each agent picks her strategy independently of the rest.
So
P (s, sN ; t|x, xN ; t) = P (s; t|x; t)
∏
j∈N
P (sj ; t|xj ; t)
= xs(1− x)1−s
∏
j∈N
x
sj
j (1− xj)1−sj .
(D8)
This reflects the fact that correlations in the system come
only through the correlations in the cooperation proba-
bility accumulated during the history of play. Equation
(D7) can then be written as
P (s, sN ; t|x; t) =
xs(1 − x)1−s ∫ 1
0
P (x, xN ; t)
∏
j∈N x
sj
j (1 − xj)1−sj dxj
P (x; t)
. (D9)
Only now we resort to the mean field approxima-
tion which neglects correlations altogether to write
P (x, xN ; t) ≈ P (x; t)
∏
j∈N P (xj ; t). Since we are in-
terested in the stationary state, we can drop the round
index t in the expressions that follow. So
P (s, sN ; t|x; t) = xs(1− x)1−s ρsj (1− ρ)1−sj , (D10)
where ρ =
∫ 1
0 xjP (xj)dxj is the average probability that
a neighbor cooperates, which equals the average proba-
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bility that the representative agent cooperates since we
are working within a mean field approximation. Intro-
ducing Eq. (D10) into Eq. (D6), we get
P (s, n, t|x, t) = xs(1− x)1−s
(
K
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)K−n, (D11)
where
(
K
n
)
= K!/n!(K − n)! is the binomial coeffi-
cient. Introducing Eqs. (D11) and (D1) into Eqs. (D3)
and (D4), Eq. (D5) yields the desired result
P (C, t+ 1|s, n, t) = 1
ρs(1− ρ)1−s
∫ 1
0
xs+1−α(1 − x)1−s P (x)
x1−α + (1− x)1−α e−β∆U(s,n)dx, (D12)
where we have used
∫ 1
0 x
s(1 − x)1−sdx = ρs(1 − ρ)1−s. Using the change of variables y = (1 − x)/x, which is
monotonous for x ∈ (0, 1), we have
P (C, t+ 1|s, n, t) = 1
ρs(1 − ρ)1−s
∫ ∞
0
y1−s(1 + y)−1 PY (y)
1 + y1−αe−β∆U(s,n)
dy. (D13)
Since we have assumed that β is small, we can expand
the right hand side of Eq. (D13) to first order in β to
obtain
P (C, t+ 1|s, n, t) = Is(α) + βJs(α)∆U(s, n), (D14)
where
Is(α) =
1
ρs(1− ρ)1−s
∫ ∞
0
y1−s(1 + y)−1 PY (y)
1 + y1−α
dy, (D15)
Js(α) =
1
ρs(1− ρ)1−s
∫ ∞
0
y2−α−s(1 + y)−1 PY (y)
(1 + y1−α)2
dy. (D16)
Using Eq. (6), we can see that Eq. (D14) is of the form
P (C, t+ 1|s, n, t) = msn/K + rs, (D17)
where
ms = βKJs(α)(as+ b), (D18)
rs = Is(α) + βJs(α) [h(2s− 1)] . (D19)
This yields the general expression introduced in the
main text paragraph after Eq. (10); in the next section,
we make use of the assumption of mono-stability.
2. Regime of mono-stability
We now make use of the assumption that the long-
term dynamics of the system is well described by the
stable fixed points of the mean field dynamics. So,
P (x) = (1 − µ)δ(x− x1) + µδ(x− x2), where x1 and x2
are the fixed points of Eq. (11) and µ yields their cor-
responding weights. In this case, the average proba-
bility for the representative agent to cooperate is ρ =
(1 − µ)x1 + µx2. If there is only one fixed point we can
take µ = 0. If there are no fixed points, the analysis here
does not apply. For simplicity, and in agreement with the
experiment we analyze [19], we assume that the dynam-
ics is essentially mono-stable, say µ ≈ 0. This implies
that the experimental global average cooperation level in
the stationary state x¯ is close to the relevant fixed point,
i.e., x¯ ≈ x1.
In this case we have ρ = x1 and PY (y) = δ(y − y1)
with y1 = (1− x1)/x1, which yields
P (C; t+ 1|s, n; t) = 1
1 + y1−α1 e
−β∆U(s,n)
; (D20)
this is the expression in Eq. (18) in the main text. In
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this case both terms in Eqs. (D15) and (D16) become
Is(α) = I(α) ≡ 1
1 + y1−α1
, (D21)
Js(α) = J(α) ≡ y
1−α
1(
1 + y1−α1
)2 , (D22)
independent of s. Eqs. (D18) and (D19) are better de-
scribed in terms of the following quantities
r =
1
2
(rC + rD) = I(α), (D23)
G = rC − rD = 2βhJ(α). (D24)
Here r and G are the mean intercept and the ‘gap’ be-
tween intercepts of the near linear trends that describe
the MCC rule [19], respectively. We can safely assume
that b 6= 0, which gives
mC −mD = β aKJ(α), (D25)
mC
mD
=
β a+ β b
β b
. (D26)
Now, Eq. (D23) can be readily inverted to obtain α
in terms of the experimental quantity r [see Eq. (D27)
below]. Similarly, using Eq. (D23) we can write
J(α) = I(α)[1 − I(α)] = r(1 − r), and so Eq. (D24) can
be readily inverted to obtain βh in terms of the experi-
mental quantitiesG and r (see Eq. (D28) below). Finally,
Eqs. (D25) and (D26) can be inverted to obtain βa and
βb in terms of the experimental quantities mC , mD, r,
and K [see Eqs. (D29) and (D30) below]. This yields
α = 1− log [(1 − r)/r]
log [(1− x¯)/x¯] , (D27)
βh =
G
2r(1− r) , (D28)
βa =
mC −mD
Kr(1− r) , (D29)
βb =
mD
Kr(1− r) , (D30)
where we have used the condition that the only stable
fixed point should equal the experimental global cooper-
ation level, i.e., x1 = x¯, to obtain Eq. (D27).
Although these equations leave the parameter β un-
determined, this combination of parameters completely
determines the coefficients that define the mean field dy-
namics through Eq. (11), and the parameters A, x0 and
y0 that locate the system in the phase diagram. Indeed,
multiplying by β in the numerator and denominator of
Eqs. (14), (15), and (16), using Eqs. (D27), (D28), (D29),
and (D30), and doing some algebra we obtain the expres-
sions
A =
mC −mD
2α r (1 − r) , (D31)
x0 = − mD +G
2(mC −mD) , (D32)
y0 = − m
2
D + 2mCG+G
2
8αr (1− r)(mC −mD) , (D33)
where the expression for α is given in Eq. (D27).
Eqs. (D31), (D32), and (D33) in principle allow us to
locate the system in the phase diagram of Fig. 1a of the
main text. However, we still need to check that these
parameter values produce a dynamics through Eq. (11)
that indeed agree with the dynamics observed in exper-
iments, within the margin of error of the experimental
results. Furthermore, we should check that indeed the
assumption of mono-stability is indeed satisfied, i.e., that
x1 ≈ x¯.
Before finishing this section notice that we can invert
Eqs. (14), (15), and (16) to recover the parameters defin-
ing the mean field dynamics in Eq. (11), which yields
βa =
2αA
K
, (D34)
βb =
4α
K
[y0 − x0(1− x0)A] , (D35)
βh = −2α (y0 + x20A) ; (D36)
here we made use of the expression y0 = −(a˜x20 + h)/2γ.
3. Regime of bi-stability
In case the system is bi-stable with a non-negligible
value of µ, we have to deal with the whole expression
P (x) = (1 − µ)δ(x− x1) + µδ(x− x2) and Eqs. (D15)
and (D16) become
Is(α) =W1,sΥ1(α) +W2,sΥ2(α), (D37)
Js(α) =W1,sΥ1(α)[1 −Υ1(α)] +W2,sΥ2(α)[1 −Υ2(α)], (D38)
where we have defined the expressions
Υℓ =
1
1 + y1−αℓ
, (D39)
Wℓ,s = µ
i−1(1 − µ)2−i
(
xi
ρ
)s(
1− xi
1− ρ
)1−s
.(D40)
Eqs. (D18) and (D19) defining the slopes and inter-
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cepts can still be inverted to obtain
βaK =
mC
J1(α)
− mD
J0(α)
, (D41)
βbK =
mD
J0(α)
, (D42)
βh =
1
2
[
rC
J1(α)
− rD
J0(α)
+
I0(α)
J0(α)
− I1(α)
J1(α)
]
.(D43)
However, the corresponding values of α are given implic-
itly by solutions to the equation
J0(α)[rC − I1(α)] + J1(α)[rD − I0(α)] = 0. (D44)
In the bi-stable regime, we can parametrize the model
in terms of α, the two stable fixed points, x1 and x2, and
the unstable fixed point xu. Indeed, if we write the fixed
point equation (13) as A(x−x0)2+ y0 = tanh−1(2x− 1),
evaluate it at two of the fixed points, say x1 and x2, and
subtract the two corresponding equations, we obtain the
following expression for A
A = FA(x2, x1|x0) ≡ ∆(x2, x1)
(x2 − x1)(x2 + x1 − 2x0) , (D45)
which defines the function FA(x2, x1|x0); here
∆(x2, x1) ≡ tanh−1(2x2 − 1)− tanh−1(2x1 − 1). (D46)
Any two fixed points that we chose would give us different
expression for A, which should be consistent. In partic-
ular, we should have A = FA(x2, xu|x0) = F (xu, x1|x0),
from which we can obtain an expression for x0 in terms
of the three fixed points, i.e.,
x0 =
(x22 − x2u)∆(xu, x1)− (x2u − x21)∆(x2, xu)
(x2 − xu)∆(xu, x1)− (xu − x1)∆(x2, xu) . (D47)
So, we can introduce any feasible values for x1, x2, and xu
into Eq. (D47) to obtain the corresponding value for x0;
from Eq. (D45) we can obtain the corresponding value
for A, and from Eq. (13) the corresponding value for y0.
Appendix E: From experimental data to model
parameters
1. General considerations
Here we depict how we estimated the parameters of the
model described by Eq. (11). We follow the framework
of partially observed Markov processes [69] and assume
that the system is described by an underlying determinis-
tic dynamics x(t) satisfying Eq. (11). We further assume
that the scientist in the laboratory observes a noisy ver-
sion xobs(t) of the underlying dynamics characterized by
Quantity Square lattice Heterogeneous network
mC 0.122 ± 0.034 0.126 ± 0.039
mD −0.149± 0.050 −0.0269 ± 0.035
rC 0.457 ± 0.015 0.475 ± 0.016
rD 0.350 ± 0.021 0.309 ± 0.069
x¯ 0.306 ± 0.024 0.355 ± 0.021
TABLE II. Experimental data for the two experiments per-
formed in Zaragoza reported in Ref. [19], which were carried
out on a square lattice and on a heterogeneous network. The
first four rows are extracted from Table S2 in Ref. [19] and
correspond to a linear fit of Figs. 3A, B in Ref. [19], while the
last row is obtained from averaging the last ten rounds in Fig.
2A in Ref. [19] (see Sec. E 2 above).
a probability distribution Pobs[xobs(t)|x(t)]. This collec-
tively describes experimental uncertainty as well as in-
trinsic stochasticity [75, 76] in the system dynamics that
has been averaged out in the derivation of Eq. (11).
To each observed trajectory xobs(1 : T ) ≡ {x(t) : t =
1, . . . , T } of T rounds, and a trajectory of the underlying
dynamics x(0 : T ) ≡ {x(t) : t = 0, . . . , T }, we can assign
a joint probability distribution
P [x(0 : T ),xobs(1 : T )|Θ] = P0[x(0)]
T∏
t=1
Pobs[xobs(t)|x(t)]Pdyn[x(t)|x(t − 1)|Θ], (E1)
where Θ represents the parameters that define the sys-
tem dynamics via Eq. (11), P0[x(0)] represents the prob-
ability distribution over the initial condition x(0) of
the underlying dynamics, and Pdyn[x(t)|x(t − 1)|Θ] is a
Dirac delta function representing the deterministic dy-
namics described by Eq. (11). Finally, we assume that
Pobs[xobs(t)|x(t)] = N [xobs(t);x(t), σ] is a Gaussian dis-
tribution of mean x(t) and standard deviation σ to be
determined later.
From the joint distribution defined in Eq. (E1)
we can obtain the probability or likelihood of ob-
serving a particular realization of the observed dy-
namics Plik[xobs(1 : T )|Θ] given the parameters Θ.
Our aim is to determine the probability of the pa-
rameters given a particular realization of the ob-
served dynamics which, following Bayes’ rule, is given
by Pθ[Θ|xobs(1 : T )] ∝ P [xobs(1 : T )|Θ]Pprior[Θ], where
Pprior[Θ] contains the prior information on the parame-
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Parameter Heterogeneous network Square lattice
m̂C 0.0545 0.0868
m̂D −0.0901 −0.2095
r̂ 0.3917 0.38765
Ĝ 0.161 0.1809
x̂(0) 0.5328 0.580
Covariance matrix (Heterogeneous network)
1.3× 10−5 −7.3× 10−6 8.5× 10−8 4.3× 10−6 −3.8× 10−6
−7.3× 10−6 1.3× 10−5 −1.8× 10−6 6.1× 10−6 −3.6× 10−6
8.5× 10−8 −1.8× 10−6 7.1× 10−5 4.9× 10−4 −1.0× 10−6
4.3× 10−6 6.1× 10−6 4.9× 10−4 3.5× 10−3 −2.0× 10−5
−3.8× 10−6 −3.6× 10−6 −1.0× 10−6 −2.0× 10−5 2.2× 10−5
Covariance matrix (Square lattice)
3.4× 10−5 −5.5× 10−6 −7.6× 10−7 3.4× 10−6 −3.0× 10−5
−5.5× 10−6 8.7× 10−6 −3.3× 10−7 1.1× 10−6 −5.4× 10−6
−7.6× 10−7 −3.3× 10−7 4.1× 10−7 9.1× 10−8 6.7× 10−7
3.4× 10−6 1.1× 10−6 9.1× 10−8 1.0× 10−5 −4.3× 10−6
−3.0× 10−5 −5.4× 10−6 6.7× 10−7 −4.3× 10−6 3.2× 10−4
TABLE III. Parameters inferred for the experiment [19] on a heterogeneous network and a square lattice using ζ = 1.96 and
ζ = 1.28, respectively (see Sec. E 2).
ters Θ. We estimate the parameter values by the average
over the posterior, i.e., Θ̂ =
∫
ΘPθ[Θ|xobs(1 : T )] dΘ.
What follows depends on whether we are in a regime
of mono-stability or bi-stability.
2. Parameter estimation in the regime of
mono-stability
We build the prior Pθ(Θ) in an indirect way. First,
we notice that Eqs. (D27), (D28), (D29), and (D30)
yield a set of values for the parameters that, along with
the initial condition x(0), define the system dynamics
through Eq. (11). So we can parametrize our model in
Eq. (11) by the collection of experimental observables
Θ = O ≡ (mC ,mD, rC , rD). To deal with the uncer-
tainty in the experimental results, we assume that any
observable O reported in the literature is described by a
uniform probability distribution supported in the interval
[O∗ − ζδO∗, O∗ + ζδO∗]. Here O∗ and δO∗ are, respec-
tively, the value reported for O and its corresponding
standard error (Tab. II); the parameter ζ is used to define
a credible interval of the reported experimental results,
e.g., if ζ ≈ 1.28 or ζ ≈ 1.96 we are dealing with a 90% or
97.5 credible interval, respectively. We rely on a uniform
rather than a Gaussian distribution on experimental re-
sults to avoid the statistics be dominated by rare events
(e.g., due to the logarithmic term in Eq. (D27)). We will
use this as a prior distribution P(O). To compute α from
O via Eq. (D27), we assume that the fixed point equals
the average global cooperation over the last ten rounds
of the experiment, i.e., x1 ≈ x¯. In this way we avoid the
technical difficulty that the prior would actually depend
on the final state of the dynamics, i.e., the fixed point.
We also estimate the standard deviation σ of the obser-
vation error to be equal to the standard deviation of the
last ten points in the time series xobs(1 : T ). We assign,
however, a standard deviation three times larger 3σ to
the first two points in the dynamics to take into account
that the adiabatic approximation is expected to capture
better the slower dynamics that follows the initial tran-
sient regime of rather fast decay.
3. Parameter estimation in the regime of
bi-stability
This case is a bit more complex since now the rela-
tionships between parameters and experimental values,
i.e., Eqs. (D41), (D42), (D43), and (D44), depend non-
trivially on the fixed points of the underlying dynamics.
Moreover, in contrast to the previous case, here we can-
not disentangle this dependence as the observed long-
term cooperation level is related to the underlying dy-
namics by x¯ = (1 − µ)x∗1 + µx∗2. The prior here is also
defined indirectly.
As discussed in Sec. D 3, in this regime it is conve-
nient to parametrize the model in Eq. (11) in terms of
the two stable fixed points, x∗1 and x
∗
2, the only un-
stable fixed point, x∗u, fixed point and α, i.e., Θ =
(α, x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
u). To take into account the influence of
the two stable fixed points on the underlying dynam-
ics, we describe the observed dynamics as xobs(t) =
(1 − µ)x1(t) + µx2(t), where x1(t) and x2(t) represents
the dynamics given by Eq. (11) with two different ini-
tial conditions x1(0) and x2(0). For any given choice of
23
Parameter Heterogeneous network Square lattice
Â 1.16 1.413
x̂0 −0.24 0.0483
ŷ0 −0.71 −0.4346
α̂ 0.263 0.4417
Covariance matrix (Heterogeneous network)
9.3× 10−2 6.7× 10−2 5.9× 10−2 −2.0× 10−2
6.7× 10−2 5.1× 10−2 4.7× 10−2 −1.5× 10−2
5.9× 10−2 4.7× 10−2 4.4× 10−2 −1.3× 10−2
−2.0× 10−2 −1.5× 10−2 −1.3× 10−2 4.4× 10−3
Covariance matrix (Square lattice)
1.6× 10−3 4.3 × 10−5 −1.0× 10−4 −5.7× 10−5
4.3× 10−5 6.8 × 10−5 5.4× 10−5 1.6× 10−6
−1.0× 10−4 5.4 × 10−5 7.4× 10−5 1.2× 10−5
−5.7× 10−5 1.6 × 10−6 1.2× 10−5 1.3× 10−5
TABLE IV. Parameters locating on the phase diagram of the
model (Fig. 1 in the main text) the experiment performed
in Zaragoza on a heterogeneous network and a square lat-
tice [19]. These data were obtained from Table III by using
Eqs. (D27), (D31), (D32), and (D33) to get the parameter val-
ues and first order error propagation to get the corresponding
covariance matrix.
the parameters Θ, we use Eqs. (D45) and (D47), and
invert Eq. (13) to compute the corresponding values of
A, x0, and y0. With these and the parameter α, we
can use Eqs. (D34), (D35), and (D36) to compute the
corresponding parameters adyn = βKa, bdyn = βKb, and
hdyn = βh that, along with the initial conditions x1(0)
and x2(0), fully specify the underlying dynamics through
Eq. (11). Furthermore, using Eqs. (D18), and (D19)
we can estimate the corresponding values for the slopes
and intercepts describing the MCC rule and then com-
pare with the experimental values reported. If the val-
ues obtained happen to be outside the credible interval
[O∗ − ζδO∗, O∗ + ζδO∗] defined by the choice of param-
eter ζ, then such a specific value for the parameters Θ
are rejected.
4. Implementation
We have used the package pomp [69] implemented in
R to perform the Bayesian inference via particle Markov
chain Monte Carlo with an adaptive random walk as pro-
posal distribution. This is a package specifically designed
for parameter inference of partially observed Markov pro-
cesses.
5. Results
Table II summarizes the experimental results reported
in Ref. [19]. The quantity x¯ represents the global level of
cooperation reached by the system of interacting humans
in the laboratory. We estimate this quantity and its stan-
dard error by computing the average and standard devi-
ation, respectively, of the global cooperation [Figs. 2(a)
and 2(b) in main text] over the last ten rounds of each of
the two experiments performed in Zaragoza [19], on an
heterogeneous network and on a square lattice. These are
the two experiments that we analyze in this manuscript
and to which we refer to in this section.
Table III shows the parameters estimated for the
two experiments and their corresponding covariance ma-
trix. In the case of the experiment on an hetero-
geneous network (respectively square lattice) we used
ζ = 1.96 (respectively ζ = 1.28) corresponding to
a uniform distribution on the experimental quantities
representing a 97.5% (respectively 90%) credible in-
terval (Sec. E 2). Since these results were obtained
in the regime of mono-stability (Sec. E 2), the pa-
rameters over which we performed Bayesian inference
were Θexp = (mC ,mD, r, G, x(0)). (In the regime of
bi-stability we did not find satisfactory results.) The
dynamical parameters are then determined through
Eqs. (D27), (D28), (D29), and (D30). Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)
in the main text show the dynamics corresponding to
these parameters in the case of the experiment on an
heterogeneous network and on a square lattice, respec-
tively. On the other hand, Figs. 2(c) and 2(d) show the
results of applying Eq. (10) in the main text using these
parameter values.
Table IV shows the corresponding values of the pa-
rameters Θdyn = (θphase, α), where θphase = (A, x0, y0)
directly locate the system in the phase diagram of the
model (Fig. 1 in the main text) and, along with α, com-
pletely determine the dynamics of the system through
Eq. (11). The covariance matrix reported is obtained by
first order error propagation of the results displayed in
Table III. This was done to take into account that the
constraints were enforced on Θexp during the inference
process and produced the best visual results of Fig. 2.
We also tried to first transform the posterior over the
parameters Θexp into a posterior on the parameters Θdyn
to then compute the average value over the latter, but the
results were less satisfactory. In any case, Fig. 1 in the
main text also show the population of parameters Θdyn
representing the corresponding posterior. We see that
the values reported in Table IV, which are also shown in
Fig. 1 on the main text, indeed appear to be representa-
tive of the population.
Finally, we estimated the Euclidean distance
d(θphase, θ
∗
c ) of the parameters θphase to the closest
point θ∗c = (A
∗
c , x
∗
0c, y
∗
0c) on the critical lines defined
by Eqs. (B6), (B7), and (B8). Following the standard
analysis of continuous phase transitions, we define a
reduced or relative distance to the critical point as
δ(Θphase, θc) = d(θphase, θc)/|Θc|, where |θc| stands for
the Euclidean norm of the vector of parameters θc.
Using the values in Tab. IV we obtained the values of
δ(Θphase,Θc) ≈ 0.03 and δ(Θphase,Θc) ≈ 0.11 for the
experiments on an heterogeneous network and on a
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square lattice, respectively.
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